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words, the legislature 'should be an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel, reason and act like them."
In this article we focus on the demographic model of representation. In practice parliaments meet this criteria if they include the same proportion of each relevant subgroup as the electorate.' Such subgroups vary from one society to another, depending on salient political cleavages, whether based on class, religion, age, sex, race, ethnicity, language or region. The underlying premise is that first-hand experience is intrinsically related to political interests. In this view northerners are the most effective spokespersons for residents of Yorkshire. miners and dockers understand and express the problems of the working class, while women comprehend and articulate the concerns of women.
The theory of demographic representation is open to many criticisms. The assumed link between social background and political attitudes is questionable on theoretical and empirical ground^.^ This provides only one standard by which a legislature can be judged representative. Nevertheless, the concept of demographic representation is a pervasive one which permeates much popular thinking, as when President-Elect Clinton said he was concerned to choose a socially diverse administration which 'looks like America'
It is well established that by this criterion most parliaments are strikingly unrepresentative: legislators in Western political elites tend to be drawn from a privileged social background.' In terms of occupational class, gender, race and education, the British Parliament is no exception. Far from representing a microcosm of the nation, the 'chattering classes' with professional occupations fill backbenches on both sides of the aisle.6 Although the number of old Etonians and Harrovians has decreased over time, many new members continue to follow the traditional path of public school plus oxbridge.' In the 1992 ' I f Only More Candidates Came For\\*ard' 375 election sixty women were returned (9.2 per cent), and six Asian or AfroCaribbean MPs (1 per cent). Concern about gender and racial membership of Parliament has increased over time although the general social bias has been familiar for years. As W. L. Guttsman noted in his classic study in the late 1960s:
If we ascend the political hierarchy, from the voters upwards. we find that at each level -the membership of political parties, party activists, local political leaders. MPs, National Leaders the social character of the group is slightly less 'representative' -and slightly more tilted in favour of those who belong to the middle and upper reaches of our society .'
Two decades later, despite numerous studies counting the number of old Etonians or Oxbridge Blues in the House, we seem little nearer to understanding the reasons for this phenome~lon. It remains a long-standing puzzle which prompts the question: why the social imbalance'?
R E S E A R C H D E S I G N , D A T A A N D M E T H O D S
This article takes a fresh look at this classic issue based on evidence from the British Candidate Study (BCS), 1992. Previous research has often focused too much attention on analysing the winners. Because the House of Commons contains many public school and Oxbridge trained lawyers, journalists and company directors, it is often assumed that this must reflect the preferences of selectors. From public sources it is easier to count, rather than explain, the number of barristers or miners in the House. But winners are only the tip of the iceberg. Nor is it appropriate to explain the outcome by comparing MPs and candidates. the next strata down. We would expect significant differences in social background and political experience because MPs represent an older generation. The outcome can only be understood if we identify each stratum: MPs, candidates, applicants, party members and voters. By comparing strata we can see whether the outcome of the selection process reflects the supply of those willing to stand for Parliament or the demands of party activists when adopting candidates for local constituencies. This simple method, in a nutshell, is our research design.
The article uses evidence drawn from the British Candidate Study, which collected data on the experience, background and attitudes of applicants and party selectors in the run-up to the 1992 general election. The study uses an interactive model which analyses both sides of the selection process. On the supply side, this article draws o n the survey of 1,681 respondents including incumbent MPs, prospective parliamentary candidates (PPCs), and applicants on party lists who had failed to be adopted in the 1992 general election (with a 69 per cent response rate). On the demand side, this article draws on the survey of 1,634 Labour and Conservative party members administered at twenty-six selection meetings throughout Britain (with a response rate of 74 per cent to part 1 and 43 per cent to part 2).
Throughout the data collection party officials gave us the fullest co-operation, assistance and support. The constituency meetings to which we had access were selected as broadly representative in terms of party, region and marginality. The information was supplemented by detailed personal interviews with party managers, MPs, candidates and applicants. These generated a series of hypotheses, as well as personal observation of a range of selection meetings at different stages in the process. Details of the research design are outlined in the Appendix. Information about voters was derived from the British General Election Study, 1987 (N.3,826) .9
Following ~01land.l' the process of getting into Parliament can be conceptualized as a multi-step ladder, illustrated in Figure 1 . This analysis compares the characteristics of different groups on the ladder in the Labour and Conservative parties." Partj, voters are those who supported the party in the 1987 general election. Part? members are the grassroots card-carrying activists at selection meetings.12 In the next step up the ladder. applicants are those on the party list, the 'pool of talent' who failed to be selected by a constituency in the 1992 election.13 Lastly at the top of the ladder are nonincumbent parliamentary candidates (PPCs) adopted for a seat and incumbent Members of Parliament (MPs) returned in the 1987 election. The term 'party elite' will be used to refer to the combined group of applicants, candidates and MPs.
The authors are most srateful to the principal investigators for this data: Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell and John Curtice.
"See Martin Holland, Candidatesfor Europe (Farnborough, Hants: Cower, 1986 
The model in Figure 2 , derived from a review of previous literature and from the statements of those we interviewed, provides an analytical framework for understanding the selection process. On the ciemundsicie selectors choose candidates depending upon their perceptions of the applicants' abilities, qualifications acd experience. Since candidates are rarely well known to most selectors, these perceptions may be coloured by direct and indirect prejudice about certain types of applicant. The term 'prejudice' is used here in a neutral sense. Prejudice can be for or against certain groups, whether lawyers. than as individuals. Irrespective of their interview performance, political interests or personal abilities, a barrister may be perceived as more articulate than a trade unionist; a local business man may be seen as better informed about employment problems in the constituency than an outsider; a woman may be expected to be more knowledgeable about childcare policy than a man. Party selectors, faced with non-local candidates, often have only minimal information on which to make their decisions. The curriculum vitae gives the bare bones. There may be hundreds of application forms. The interview process is relatively short and formal. Accordingly members may rely upon background characteristics as a proxy measure of abilities and character, prejudice functions as an information short-cut. As a result individuals are judged by their group characteristics.
Indirect prejudice is different. Here party members may personally favour a certain category of candidate ('I'd like to vote for a woman', 'We need more blacks in Parliament'), or an individual applicant ('The Asian was the best prepared speaker'). But members may be unwilling to choose such a candidate because they expect they would lose votes among the electorate ('But she'd never get in', 'There aren't enough black voters in Cheltenham'). Demand-side explanations suggest the social bias in Parliament reflects the direct and indirect prejudices of party selectors.
In our interviews many expressed the belief that party members prefer welleducated, professional men in early middle-age, the 'right sort' of candidates
'If Only More Cancii(iates Came For\tsurd'
379 who will fit into the local party, serve the constituency and appeal strongly to local voters.I4 What do party members look for? An experienced Conservative central office official summarized the position thirty years ago:
What most associations want is a man of solid character. Not necessarily a brilliant man, you understand; in fact they may distrust a chap who seems too brilliant or flashy or glib. They want someone with the right sort of background, someone who looks and sounds right. They want someone they can count on to do the right thing, whether as a campaigner or a leader in association affairs or a Member of Parliament. They want someone who, by his business career or his war record or his party service or his social standing, has proved he is this kind of man.''
The search for the 'right chap' has broadened somewhat in the Conservative party in recent years, at least from army majors to merchant bankers, but similar echoes can be heard today in many of those we interviewed. Conservative MPs and candidates explained, in different ways, how some groups are ruled in while others are ruled out:
Conservative committees . . . look for candidates in their own image. They look for candidates who will have a fair bit of money, preferably a county background. connections, and if he happens to be a barrister, or something important in the City of London, then they think he's an ideal chap!'" You're much more likely to go for the same options -to pick the merchant bankers. the solicitors, and the people from Eton and Harrow and Cambridge and Oxford, because they've been through the system and know what to expect. Why on earth would you interview a housewife from a seaside town whose photo looks quite nice and someone said she's awfully good at public speaking? But where did she go to school. what's her background? You haven't got the accreditation. have you?" People start with prejudices about the candidates. In the old days, they used to band them and say 'We're not having anybody under 40, nobody over 50. or we're not having a lawyer, or we're not having somebody from the south-east', or whatever it might be. Whatever prejudice they decided to start with knocked out a whole lot of people many of whom might have been exactly what they really wanted."
But the obvious cause of the social bias in Parliament -the prejudice of party members -is not necessarily the most significant one. Prejudice may be a popular explanation, but this might be based on inferences from the outcome. rather than any good evidence. In a plea of mitigation. party members frequently claim their hands were tied: they would like to short-list more well-qualified For a recent statement of this assumption, see Andrew Adonis: 'By and large, the selectorate. itself a predom~nately middle class cohort, discriminates against men without a professional. political or managerial background and -at least until recently -against women of all kinds' (Parliumenr Toduy (Manchestec Manchester University Press, 1990 
women, Asians from the local community or experienced working-class candidates, they say, but few come forward. Suppb-side explanations suggest the outcome reflects the supply of applicants wishing to pursue a political career. Constraints on resources (such as time, money and experience) and motivational factors (such as drive, ambition and interest) determine who aspires to Westminster. Most citizens, other than lunatics, traitors and peers, and a few other categories, are legally qualified to stand. Few do so. The narrow path leading to a political career is usually risky, gruelling and unglamorous. Nursing a hopeless seat for a couple of years -slogging up to the constituency every weekend, banging on unfriendly doors to drum up support, going to poorly attended party committees in draughty halls, helping to raise funds with whist drives, raffles and jumble sales, juggling work, party committees and constituency demands -requires stamina, optimism and dedication.19 The resources and motivation applicants bring to the role will vary according to their social background. Younger teachers from the Midlands, well-established middle-aged lawyers, self-employed company directors, experienced Scottish trade unionists and London women social workers will bring different skills, qualifications and assets to political life. Most of those we interviewed emphasized the difficulties of a political career. When asked what advice they would give those considering a political career, many MPs stressed the life was not for everybody; hard work, time, energy and dedication were essential:
You've got to be committed to it. If you're in doubt whether you really want to do it, I would say don't do it, because if you're going for a safe seat it is going to be a total commitment. It is going to totally change your lifestyle, and [you must] be prepared for that, for a start it would mean moving home, you're giv~ng up your job, and you're taking on something which is really a bit of a 24 hours-a-day, seven-days-aweek existence. If you're not really prepared to accept that I would say don't even contemplate it." 1 would say be single-minded, you'll have to sacrifice careers, families, relationships, all that sort of stuff, which can be quite tough. My wife always says every MP should be a celibate bachelor there's a lot in that -so you've really got to sort out your -personal life, it puts an unbel~evable strain on relationships . . .and I'd also say, it isn't "'I would go up once a month to the Executive. When I started with great enthusiasm I went up every week as well, and began knocking on doors. It was an utterly pointless exercise really. You see my task was to help create an association. It was an association they claimed was totally demoralized, neglected; the fact is that it's a tiny, tiny association run by some councillors who are there in a minority, who all hate each other because there are so few of them, and they're all getting on in years . . . it was raising virtually no money, it had a dreadful old office, it doesn't have any professional agent. so my first task was really to give the association some confidence I've spent all this money which I hadn't realized I'd spent. I've lost my husband. and I've got a lot of wrinkles. I've had a lot of fun but really it's been the main reason my marriage has been destroyed, frankly, which is a terrible price to pay."
Make sure you've got good feet, a good bladder, a skin like a rhinoceros. I should say that's terribly important." Accordingly supply-side explanations of the social bias in Parliament suggest the outcome reflects the pool of applicants seeking a political career.
In practice supply-side and demand-side factors interact. Perceived prejudice by party activists, complex application procedures, or anticipated failure, may discourage potential candidates from coming forward. The concept of hidden unemployment ('Why apply? I won't get the job') is a perfect analogy for the 'discouraged political aspirant'. The assumptions in this model suffer from certain limitations." Nevertheless, despite these qualifications, there remains an important distinction between the factors holding individuals back from applying for a position ('I'm not interested', 'I don't have the right experience', 'I can't afford to move') and the factors which mean that, if they apply, they are not accepted by selectors ('He's not locally known', 'She's not got the right speaking skills', 'He would not prove popular with voters'). The supplyside and demand-side distinction therefore provides a useful analytical framework to explore alternative explanations.
The relative importance of supply and demand factors are tested throughout this article using simple descriptive statistics, with multiple regression for the final analysis. The model controls for party given important differences in the Labour and Conservative selection process and outcome. The two basic hypotheses. derived from our understanding of the process, are as follows:
(i) If demand-side factors are important, we would expect a significant difference in the characteristics of applicants and candidates. (ii) If supply-side factors are important, we would expect a significant difference in the characteristics of party members and applicants.
At constituency-level party selectors are choosing from among the pool of applicants. If members favour certain groups over others, the contrast would be evident in differences between applicants and candidates. On the other hand, if some members lack the resources or motivation to stand, this would be apparent in differences between members and applicants. constituencies who are not on the national lists, for example some local applicants. But these cases tend to be exceptional, particularly in the Conservative party given the status of the Approved List. Secondly, some rejected aspirants never get on the list. In the Labour party trade unions screen who goes on the 'A' list,25 while constituencies nominate people for the 'B' list. All nominees are added to the list after formal rubber-stamping by the central party organization in Walworth Road. In the Conservative party all aspirants are interviewed by Central office and put through a rigorous weekend national selection board.
Only 40 per cent of those who aspire are put on the Approved List. Accordingly there is a hidden pool of rejected aspirants not counted in our sample of those on the national lists. We can make no claims about this group although observation of the Conservative Party Selection Boards leads us to believe those involved make every effort not to discriminate against any particular social groups. Screening the Approved Lists does not invalidate the test of demandside factors at constituency level. Thirdly, as mentioned earlier with the concept of 'hidden unemployment', there is probably a group of 'discouraged aspirants', who never put their name forward for consideration, since they anticipate being unsuccessful. Again we make no claims to be able to analyse the characteristics of all groups in the process. There are many steps up the ladder from party member to MP. The comparison of applicants and candidates tells us a great deal about the process, but not everything about all stages.
Fourthly, in the Labour party, members may choose to participate in the electoral college through postal voting. Since the survey of party members was conducted at selection meetings and lists of those who took part through the post remained confidential, we have no survey data about this group.
Lastly, 'supply and demand' factors operate within a broader institutional and political context, which cannot be dealt with adequately within the limited scope of this a r t i~l e .~' The selection process works differently within each party, under certain guidelines and procedures. And in turn the parties operate within a broader political system, where opportunities to become a candidate are influenced by the legal system, the electoral system, legislative turnover and the wider political culture. These factors are particularly important when "It is difficult to generalize about the process of getting on the union 'A' list since different unions use different procedures. Some like ASLEF include 'rising political stars' in any occupation whom they feel would make good Labour MPs, not just union members. Other unions, like the AEU, insist nominees are employed in their trade, and they use a very rigorous week-long assessment process testing verbal and written skills, knowledge of Labour party policy, public speaking ability and personal interviews. Labour party rules do not control or standardize this process, leaving it to the discretion of the unions concerned.
' "ee, however. trying to explain differences between countries, although they are less useful when focusing on the process and outcome within specific parties. Accordingly we start briefly sketching the institutional context for all British candidates before focusing on supply and demand explanations.
I N S T I T U T I O N A L C O N T E X T
In the British political system opportunities to stand for Parliament are determined by four specific factors. First, almost any British citizen willing to risk f 500 can become a candidate, with minor exceptions." There were 2,617 names on the ballot in the 1992 general election. But there are few chances of winning outside the major parties. Despite the growth of the centre and regional parties since the late 1960s, over 90 per cent of seats continue to be won by Labour and the Conservatives.
Secondly. opportunities for good seats in these parties are restricted due to the rate of incumbency turnover. In the postwar period 91 per cent of all MPs who chose to stand again were returned. There are two routes for new MPs: candidates can inherit open seats where the previous MPs retired, or challengers can defeat incumbents. In the postwar period, in general elections and by-elections, this has produced about 140 new members for each Parliament. Therefore, even in the major parties most new candidates face inevitable disappointment unless there is a massive electoral landslide, such as in 1945.
Thirdly, candidates can do little to change these odds. There is a modest personal vote evident in the cycle of a 'retirement slump' and 'second-time surge'." But in Britain the strength of party voting, and the focus of attention on the national campaign, leadership and platform, means that individual candidates, by their own efforts, can rarely improve their party's share of the vote."
Lastly, Labour and Conservative candidates are nominated by party members in local constituencies. The power of Conservative Central Office and the Labour party's National Executive Committee to influence the process in indivi- ', Parliatnei~mry A.fairs. 35 (1992) . 497-51. ' 9 In the Harris Exit Poll in the 1992 general election voters were asked to nominate the single most important reason for supporting the party just voted for. The following responses were given: the party's policies. 47 per cent; I usually vote for that party, 20 per cent; dislike of another party. 15 per cent. the party leader. 7 per cent: the local candidate, 5 per cent: none of these.dual constituencies is very re~tricted.~' Therefore the key decision about who gets the good seats, hence who gets elected into Parliament and ultimately -into government -lies in the hands of the local Labour and Conservative gatekeepers. About two-thirds of constituencies are conventionally judged safe; in these selection for the incumbent party is tantamount to election.
S O C I A L B A C K G R O U N D
Given the supply and demand debate, this article uses the survey evidence to contrast the characteristics of different party strata. To recapitulate our method, if supply factors are important the main contrast would be between members and applicants. If demand factors are important the main contrast would be between applicants and candidates (see Figure 3) .
Fig.3. The method ofanalysis
We can start by considering differences between party strata in the social characteristics commonly included in previous research on the British political elite including occupational class, education, age, gender, ethnicity, children and marital status.
Occupational Class
The most important and complex of the background factors is occupation. It is well established that over time Parliament has become more socially homogeneous on both sides of the aisle, with a decline in Conservative landed gentry and Labour's ex-miners and engineers. Today, in common with other legislature, the British Parliament contains a disproportionate number of those drawn from the 'talking professions', notably law, journalism, lecturing and teaching3' Nevertheless the reasons for this are not well understood. Previous research provides various demand-side explanations: Ranney suggests party members, even in the labour party, fail to choose working-class candidates because of social deferen~e.~' Bochel and Denver found that manual workers were seen by party members as less able and a r t i~u l a t e .~~ Greenwood argues that attempts by Conservative Central Office to increase the number of workingclass trade-union candidates failed due to local party re~istance.~'
On the supply side, previous research by Ranney explained the class bias in Parliament by the resources middle-class professional occupations provide for a political career: flexible working hours, useful political skills, social status and political contact^.^' The most illuminating supply-side explanation, by Jacob, uses the concept of 'brokerage o~cupations'.~' This suggests parliamentary careers are facilitated by jobs which combine flexibility over time, generous vacations, allowance for interrupted career-paths, professional independence, financial security, public networks, social status, policy experience and technical skills useful in political life. Brokerage jobs -barristers, teachers, trade-union officials, journalists, political researchers -are complementary to politics. They minimize the costs and risks of horizontal mobility from the economic to political marketplace, and vice versa, since being a Member of Parliament is an uncertain life. In our interviews we found some with early political ambitions consciously chose a brokerage career which they knew would be combined with pursuit of a seat. Some faced hostile employers, even dismissa~,~' while others worked for companies who encouraged employees with parliamentary ambitions, since they recognized the political advantages of contacts in Westminster. The importance of flexible brokerage jobs and sympathetic employers was stressed by many applicants. Some referred to it as the need for suitable 'jumping off points into politics.
Being active in politics mucks up your career like nobody's business. I mean, it really causes havoc . ..and if you've been an MP and then lose your seat, it again causes havoc, so you've got to say to yourself, I'm interested in politics, and I'm prepared to forgo lots of career opportunities for the sake of what I believe in politics.lR Certain employers are quite keen to encourage their employees to do things, and I have to say that I think that unless you're lucky -the silver spoon touch -you've either got to be self-employed or work for such a company.19 I said at point of employment, 'My ultimate interest is to be a Member of Parliament. I always want to be able to take leave during party conferences and general elections' . . . The university gave me special leave to fight my two campaigns, they were fantastic, '' One Conservative candidate reported being dismissed by an unsympathetic employer for requesting leave of absence to fight the campaign: 'They said to me they wanted me gone as soon as the election was called. So I had to face that election with absolutely nothing. It was terrible when you've got that at the back of your mind. You've got all the excitement of the campaign but I knew there was no job at the end of that.'
''Personal interview with Labour candidate, No. 13. '' Personal interview with a Conservative candidate. No. 10. they were good employers on that score, very good employers . . . At Unilever they were very much an American-style company, where they wanted not only your heart but your soul, and I think I would have found it very difficult there in subsequent times when I wanted to fight campaigns, to be on the local c~u n c i l .~' What I thought, rightly or wrongly, was that as a solicitor in London I could earn my living there and be an MP, because my work is basically in court in the morning, whereas if you're a barrister you have all-day cases -so it would've fitted in."
The brokerage explanation helps illuminate not just the class disparity, but also why women and ethnic minorities are under-represented in Parliament. since they are often concentrated in low-paying skilled and semi-skilled occupations, or in family small businesses, with inflexible schedules and long hours, in sectors which do not provide traditional routes to political life.
In order to examine the importance of occupational class on a systematic basis, party strata are compared using the respondent's occupational socioeconomic group. summarized into manualinon-manual categories. Work status is included, distinguishing those in paid work from others, and trade-union membership since it was anticipated this might prove significant in the Labour party.
The analysis in Table 1 confirms the familiar observation that MPs are drawn overwhelmingly from professional and managerial occupations. The Parliamentary Labour Party is dominated by public-sector employees: lecturers, teachers, journalists, local government managers, political researchers, trade-union officials and welfare officers. By contrast, in the Conservatives there are more private sector managers, company directors, financial advisers and barristers.
But, more importantly, the results indicate the explanation for this phenomenon: the class bias of Parliament is the product of supply rather than demand. Within each party, the socio-economic status of MPs. candidates and applicants is almost identical. If, for argument's sake, all incumbents resigned and all applicants took their place, the social composition of the Commons would be largely unaffected. Within each party the elite has higher social status than members, while members have higher status than voters. Parliament is dominated by the professional 'chattering classes' because journalists, lawyers, selfemployed business men, financial consultants and university lecturers have sufficient security, flexibility and income to gamble on a political career.
Education
In terms of education, it is well known that Parliament contains far more graduates, especially from Oxford and Cambridge, and far more from public school, than the general electorate. Despite the extensive attention given to this phenomenon, the reasons for it are not well established. Ranney suggests the explanation rests with demand: party members select the better educated because this is a sign of ability and social status, and they wish to 'choose A seat which is either winnable or safe looks for two things. I fear they do still go for the Old Guard -the old Etonian and the son of an MP . . . if you come in that way they don't look for anything. you can go straight in."
Yet, equally plausibly, on the supply-side education may influence recruitment through motivation and resources. In European elections Holland found selectors could not be blamed for favouring those of higher status; there was a greater public school/ Oxbridge and socio-economic bias among the total pool of applicants than those chosen.45 The body of literature on political participation has consistently found education to be one of the best predictors of activism; increasing political knowledge, interest, confidence and skills. The influence of education continues even after controlling for income, although its effect on campaign activism is less clear-cut than other modes of participat i~n .~" Table 2 confirms that MPs are drawn disproportionately from the better educated; 70 per cent of MPs are graduates compared with 6 per cent of voters. But, more interestingly, the results indicate that education effects recruitment primarily through supply rather than demand. In the Conservative party MPs, candidates and applicants are equally well qualified. But there is a precipitous fall in the proportion of university graduates from the party elite to members, and another decline from members to voters. In the Labour party there is a similar pattern, although the graduate gap is less between applicants and members, and greater between members and voters.47 Nor can the selectors be blamed for favouring those who have followed the traditional public school plus Oxbridge route; again this reflects the proportion of applicants who fall into this category. As with brokerage occupations, higher education influences the supply of volunteers willing to risk a political career. In parenthesis, it is worth noting that at the grassroots level, the rise of the Labour polytocracy. combined with the age and gender profile of the Conservatives, means that ironically the workers' party is now the better educated There was always the assumption that if you were selecting a woman you were taking a risk. I've sat on both sides of selection committees, and nobody will ever say 'Well. I don't want a woman'. They'll never say that ever, they'll always say, 'Well I don't mind. but in this constituency ready for a woman?'" Older women, though, often feel they couldn't do that job. and they're not [going to] vote for you to do it."
Alternatively gender can be seen as a supply-side effect: due to the conventional division of labour in the family, segregation in the labour market and traditional patterns of socialization, we would expect many women to have lower resources of time and money. and lower levels of political ambition and confidence. Bochel and Denver stress supply-side factors for the dearth of women politicians; if more women came forward to pursue a parliamentary career, the study suggests. more would be nominated.': Based on studies of local councillors. Bristow attributed women's reluctance to a lack of volition." while Hills stressed life-style constraints, where politics have to be juggled with the dual demands of employment and family." An earlier study by Rush found that supply-side factors were most important: in the Conservative party women were the majority of grassroots members but only 10 per cent of those on the Approved ~i s t . " Some of those we interviewed believed that many women were underconfident and reluctant to stand:
We don't have nearly enough working-class MPs and women who have had the experience of holding down a job, being a full-time mother. knowing the problems of. you know. elementary things like transport for the children and when the buses run -those talents and skills that women have are so undervalued, and usually women'll say. 'Oh well. I'm only this' . . . 'but all I've ever done is . . .'. and 'this is all I can do'. and that sort of thing."
Gender could also interact with the effects of marital status and children. On balance married candidates would be expected to be advantaged over those who were single. since constituencies often look for a 'team'. although given traditional attitudes marriage and children may prove an advantage for a man but a disadvantage for a woman.j7 As our interviewees saw it:
If you're a man, they think that if they are also getting a wife, they're getting two for the price of one, essentially. The wife will open functions. and go to fktes, and be a help in the constituency while he's down in London and all the rest of it . . .But with a woman it's the other way around. Because she is married they see her. as the support to her husband."
They all asked me how I would cope with my family if I was to get this seat, which I'm sure they don't ask the men. And if I turned around to them and said. 'Well, my husband will look after the family,' they went. 'Oh, yeah?"' A comparison of the characteristics of party strata by gender indicates that supply seems more important for Conservative women, while demand plays a greater role in the Labour party (see Table 3 ).
Parliament includes twenty Conservative and thirty-seven Labour women MPs. Given this situation. some believe Conservative party selectors, with traditional family values. must be prejudiced against women. But we found about the same proportion of women Conservative candidates and applicants, which suggests women party members are reluctant to pursue a Westminster career. Conservative women are the majority of the grassroots party. the backbone of the organization in terms of constituency officeholders and participants at party conference. but they are not coming forward in equal numbers to stand for Parliament. The most plausible explanation is that many women members tend to be middle-aged with traditional roles in the home. or elderly pensioners. with few formal educational qualifications. This generational difference was well expressed by a Conservative woman MP:
There was an older generation than us, who didn't approve of us being political. They thought we should do the coffee mornings and the committees and all that sort of 37 40 52 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Murttal ~tatuc. thing. And I think we, and I would say most of us in our forties and thirties, when we came along and were stridently political, this was a shock to them.
In the Labour party women have made considerable progress in Parliament, almost doubling their numbers in the last general election, to represent 13.6 per cent of Labour MPs. Yet, contrary to popular assumptions, women seem to face greater problems from Labour than Conservative party selectors. In the Labour party women were 40 per cent of individual members, and about the same proportion (37 per cent) of applicants, but only 26 per cent of candidates. Therefore more Labour women are coming forward than are being selected. The main reason for this, our interviewees suggested, was that more men had trade-union connections which helped in terms of sponsorship and informal constituency contacts, an explanation which needs to be explored further in future work.
Ruce
The data on race in the electorate and party elite is derived from a small numbers of cases, and hence may prove unreliable. Ethnic minorities represent only about 4.8 per cent of the adult British population,60 and the population is clustered in certain constituencies, which causes problems for any conventional election survey. Previous research suggests direct racism by party activists may have influenced some recent selection^.^' An Afro-Caribbean candidate suggested racism influenced perceptions about applicants:
A lot of people were very suspicious about black people -stereotypes -there were wrong things said about black people in the Labour party, and quite often by people whom we regarded as our representatives and our leaders, who should set standards. And somehow if you're black you just had a certain role that was supportive -don't come out too far. If you came out too far, you've got a chip on your shoulder, you're an extremist.
Although the evidence that non-white candidates suffer an electoral penalty is mixed,62 indirect prejudice may count against them.67 One Asian Labour candidate mentioned having been given this factor as a reason when he asked why he failed to get support in a selection contest:
'Well, the reason I didn't vote for you', he said, 'was because we were worried about we might lose the vote.' I said, 'Well, you have a cheek to tell me to my face. Well, I'll tell you something: I would have got more votes than this person, because of my 
The Injuence of Supply-Side Factors
To summarize the results so far, the influence of supply-side factors can be assessed by comparing the social characteristics of members and applicants. In both parties the most striking supply-side contrasts were by age, class and education. Members least likely to come forward as Conservative applicants included the elderly, women, the lower middle-class and the less educated. In the Labour party there was a similar but not identical pattern; those least likely to seek office included members who were elderly, less educated, manual workers and non-trade unionists. The influence of demand is shown by differences between applicants and candidates. As in other careers, age proved important: selectors preferred younger applicants. In addition, women and perhaps ethnic minorities seemed disadvantaged by the Labour selectorate. But the most striking finding was that, in most respects, candidates were very similar to the total pool of applicants. Contrary to previous studies, there is no evidence in this analysis for discrimination by party selectors on the grounds of education or class. Parliament includes a social bias towards the better educated and middle-class, because this reflects the pool of applicants. This mirrors the well-established socio-economic bias in political participation in other forms of political activity. If other types of applicants came forward, this suggests, probably more would be selected.
R E S O U R C E S

Time
On this basis we can test for direct differences in the resources of applicants and candidates. Resources are defined as assets which can be employed to advantage in pursuing a political career, including time, money, political experience, social networks. Among resources time may be among the most important, since standing for office is a demanding activity requiring attendance at regular constituency meetings, social and fund-raising events, local 'surgeries', public speaking engagements, door-to-door leafleting, canvassing and campaigning in local as well as general election^.^^ Applicants need to invest time in the selection process, in nursing a seat and in the final general election campaign. In the Conservative party, where applicants trail around the country for any vacancy, the interview process can be gruelling. Preparation for an interview, finding out about the constituency, also requires time. Once they get a seat, even a hopeless one, candidates then need to spend years campaigning, as one stressed:
If one's working full-time, the stress and strain that it puts candidates under -travelling and commitments . . . I mean, they spend a good two-and-a-half, maybe three years, all their free time . . . at night time you're on the phone, you're perhaps travelling Previous studies suggest flexibility over scheduling may be important; paid leave of absence from work andlor child-care during the month-long formal campaign may be more indispensable than free evenings and weekends." Candidates need to anticipate being dedicated to the job, once elected: MPs claimed to spend almost twice the average workload, 66 hours per week, on their work at Westminster and in their con~tituencies.~' In sum, applicants with more time to invest in a political career can be expected to move up the ladder of recruitment.
In this analysis time is measured by the number of hours devoted to party activities, in categories ranging from less than 5 hours, to more than 20 hours, in the average month. This was a mid-term period, it should be remembered, fieldwork was six to twelve months before candidates devoted themselves fulltime to the hectic activity of the formal campaign. The results indicate a substantial difference in the time invested in party work by these groups (see Table  5 ). In the Conservative party 87 per cent of candidates, but only 35 per cent of applicants, were in the most active group, devoting over twenty hours per month to party activities. In the Labour party 83 per cent of candidates, compared with 53 per cent of applicants, fell into this category. In contrast the least activity category included almost no candidates, but quite a few Labour and Conservative applicants (12 and 18 per cent respectively). This confirms the evidence of personal interviews that candidates need to devote themselves wholeheartedly to the task for a long time before the start of the official campaign. But, once more, the greatest contrasts were between the elite and members, since half the Labour members were entirely passive.7'
Financial
In Britain financial resources are less significant today than in the prewar period, where contemporary accounts suggest personal expenditure was sometimes decisive in gaining good seats. .'It should be noted that this data IS unavailable at present for Conservative members.
'"See Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, British Politirul Finance 1830 -1980 (Washington. DC: American Economic Institute. 1981 The financial side of it is, I think, prohibitive, because it's almost selective in itself. As I said, if I had had children, and been in a different situation financially, then there's no way I could've contemplated it.-' First, there are the expenses associated with being selected: travel, clothes, local research, accommodation, training sessions and party conferences. Applicants travelling around the country for interviews pay their own expenses. Recent Labour party reforms have lengthened the process, and increased the number of ward and constituency meetings candidates must attend. Then, if adopted, candidates must meet their personal expenses in nursing the constituency, often for one or two years before the campaign. This includes direct expenses like communications and transport, plus the hidden costs of time away from work, possibly child-care or home help. How much does it all cost'? Estimates varied. Local candidates already resident in the constituency, or those sponsored by their trade union, thought it only cost a few hundred pounds.
The most cost I've ever encountered was petrol from home to the constituency . . . getting on the list, perhaps there would be £70 to £80 for your hotel. your overnight stay. You could probably add in going to conference every year, that sort of thing, but in a way it's a bit like a holiday. So you have to balance the day's enjoyment against f 150 or whatever it was it cost you.-' Those with more distant seats thought it cost them anywhere from £3,000 to £ 10,000. For some this proved prohibitive. One who became unemployed had to withdraw from his constituency before the election. Another Conservative MP noted: The costs of selection are borne by you, the costs of nursing the seat are borne by you . . . I should think about f10,000 over the three-year period. I was selected in '76, and fought the seat in '79 -there was travel and accommodation and subsistence To assess the effect of financial resources, party strata were compared by the household's total incol?ze,divided into seven bands (see Table 6 ). Candidates were found to have very similar incomes to applicants. Indeed in the Conservative party applicants were slightly more affluent, although in the Labour party slightly more applicants were in the lower bands. But the most striking contrast was between the political elite and voters: two-thirds of Labour voters were in households with incomes less than f 10,000 compared with one-third of members and only 8 per cent of the Labour elite.
As we might expect there were also noticeable differences between parties, with Conservative MPs by far the most affluent group. The results confirm the thesis that financial resources effect supply rather than demand: those without a comfortable income may feel they just cannot afford the financial investment required to nurse a seat, particularly given the risk of electoral failure.
Political E.uperience
Political experience may be another vital resource. Members who have already held public office can be expected to have developed polltical expertise, speaking skills, practical knowledge of government and social contacts, which will be useful in gaining a seat. A parliamentary career is usually the apex of years involved in ward, constituency and executive party meetings, the local or county Personal interview with Conservative MP, No. 31 council, the trade-union movement, community work or public service. As one Conservative MP described the process it was a gradual escalator:
After I'd been a councillor for a while a borough councillor -I started to see some -of the decis~ons taken a bit further away at County Council. I became a County Councillor immediately after that and then, of course, one sees all the big decisions taken in Parliament, and I became more and more interested in that."
Most noted how many overlapping political commitments they had, which gradually took over their lives, as one northern Conservative candidate remarked:
I'm on the town council, I'm on the district council, I'm on the county council, I'm on various voluntary bodies the community health council, Relate, the Council for -Voluntary Services -I'm a governor of the local radio station . . .its a merry-go-round.
When I started in politics I had a full-time job, eventually it became a part-time job, and eventually the job virtually became n~n-existent.-~ Ranney suggests long-standing party or union service is particularly important in the Labour party.80 Candidates often assume they have to be 'blooded' by fighting a hopeless seat before they will be considered for a good one, although too many consecutive failures may count against applicants.
We compare the political e.uperience of party strata by measuring a range of different types of activism: including whether party members had ever held local, regional or national party office; considered standing, been a candidate or elected to the local council; and been a candidate at a previous general election. These items were added for a summary scale, weighted according to the level of office (see Table 7 ). Nearly all the elite had been active in their local party, while the majority had been local councillors and served on local public bodies as the first steps up the ladder.
The most striking finding is that candidates were no more experienced than applicants, indeed in the Conservative party the reverse held true; applicants had slightly more experience through standing for Parliament and holding local office. Once more the main contrast, where comparisons could be drawn, was between members and the party elite; for example, less than one-fifth of members had run for local government compared with 80 per cent of the elite. We can conclude that candidates need to demonstrate some political experience, to have 'done their bit', but given the amateur tradition no more is required.
Support Net\t,orks
Support networks may be an important resource of information, advice and direct endorsements. We would expect those who received widespread encouragement from closes friends, party members, party agents, community groups, business associates, trade unionists and employers, as well as their immediate family, would be more likely to consider a parliamentary career, and better placed to get a good seat. In the Labour party many stressed the importance of local contacts, especially with trade-union branches:
One candidate in the last selection I was in was asked how it was he'd got thirty-three nominations. He very honestly explained that he'd been around a long time, he knew a lot of these people, he often went out drinking with them, and therefore when he phoned them up to say, "Ow about the NUPE or the T&GWU?' -or whatever the nomination -[he got the reply,] 'Yeah, all right, I'll send you the form'." Through having worked in the area I did develop a lot of contacts and a lot of friends, and especially the person who encouraged me to go for seats in the first place, and so he was there, and actually on the ground, and knew what was happening, and there was therefore very much of a support network a~ailable.~'
In the Conservative party, social networks, developed through national fundraisers, constituency work or Central Office, were seen as invaluable in identifying good opportunities, getting advice about procedures, or simply as a source of encouragement, a steer in the right direction:
When you get to a certain level these contacts really can be very, very useful to you. The netivorks of party strata are compared using a fifty-point scale measured according to the level of support which applicants reported from ten different groups, ranging from family to employers. The results in Table 8 again indicate minimal differences between candidates and applicants; all reported fairly positive support from most groups.
M O T I V A T I O N
Politicul Ambition
Lastly, although many people have resources, only a few choose a political career. The combination of resources plus motivation produces the necessary and sufficient conditions for candidacies. Motivational factors are defined as psychological predispositions to become involved in politics. Previous research has commonly explained activism by higher levels of political ambition, interest and c~nfidence.~"lthough intuitively plausible, motivational factors are some of the most difficult variables to measure. ambition under the cloak of public service; bitter failure may produce plausible rationalizations. The ambition of applicants was explored using an open-ended question: 'What was the single most important reason why you first wanted to stand for Parliament?' This is a very limited measure but it provides an indication of the initial motivation. Reasons for standing were explored in greater depth in the personal interviews with some respondents. Based on this, survey responses were coded into six major categories according to whether applicants were motivated primarily by personal career, ideology, public service, party standard bearers, single issues and group representatives. Our hypothesis assumed candidates with personal career motives would be more ambitious than those standing for other reasons. Accordingly in the final model urnbition was coded as a dichotomous variable. The results of this classification, given in Table 9 , suggest a party difference: perhaps due to ideological reasons the Conservatives tended to stress the public service role while Labour favoured that of 'group representative'. Nevertheless by this measure there was no major difference in the motivation of candidates and applicants.
Drive
Plausibly we would expect drive to be important, since candidates who were more persistent would be expected to be more successful. One Labour MP suggested one of the main difficulties in the initial stages was maintaining motivation: Drive is another difficult psychological concept to assess. In this model it is gauged by a proxy behavioural measure, namely the number of seats applied for in the 1992 election. Logically the more tenacious the applicant, this hypothesis assumes, the better their chances of being interviewed and adopted for a good seat.
T A B L E 9
Motivation
Contrary to expectations, Conservative candidates applied for fewer seats (12) than applicants (17). In the Labour party there was little difference between applicants and candidates, although due to the greater emphasis on localism both applied for fewer seats than Conservatives. This throws doubt on the idea that people on the party list are not actively pursuing vacancies. Particularly in the Conservative party they are trying but failing. What still requires explanation, therefore, is why some Conservative applicants are less successful despite their tenacity. O n the basis of more detailed analysis of these applicants it seems plausible to suggest these are usually experienced members who have given years of faithful party service, and have stood before, but who are n o longer seen as attractive or electable candidates because of their age. They find themselves, often bitterly, left on the party shelf. of members and applicants, based on different samples, unfortunately it is not possible to use the standard multivariate tests to evaluate the relative impact of these variables on the supply of applicants. It is possible, however, to test whether these variables influence demand. Based on the discussion so far, the null hypothesis would suggest these factors would have little ability to predict whether respondents were candidates or applicants. Accordingly after testing for multi-collinearity, the variables measuring resources, motivation and social background were entered into a least-squared regression model, in this order, to see whether these factors distinguished between candidates and applicants. Since we would anticipate the effects might be different in the Conservative and Labour party, the model was run separately for each party.
Three major points emerge from this analysis (see Table 10 ). First, most importantly, the results in the main confirm the null hypothesis. Party selectors did not choose candidates on the basis of education, social class, trade-union membership, financial resources, ambition or support networks. The evidence suggests these factors influence supply rather than demand. Secondly, time proved significant in both parties: as we have noted candidates devote far more hours to party work than applicants. Yet this finding is open to interpretation. Whether selectors look for candidates who have time to devote to their constituency, or candidates spend more time on party work by virtue of their official position, remains an open question.
Lastly, in the Conservative party, contrary to expectations, successful candidates applied for less seats, had less political experience, and were less likely to be married or have children than applicants. This poses a puzzle. Based on everything else we know, it seems counter-intuitive to propose that party selectors are looking for less experienced applicants. The most convincing explanation points to the critical importance of the age of those short-listed; many on the Conservative approved list are older members who, despite extensive local government experience and party service, may be seen by selectors as less attractive than younger and potentially more dynamic contenders.
In conclusion, as J. F. S. Ross observed in analysing the composition of Parliament in the interwar years:
In no single respect age, education, occupation, sex, social standing, party -does -the composition of the House of Commons reflect that of the community. The differences, moreover, are not the minor deviations inseparable from any system of representation: they are radical divergences.'-Forty years later we are little closer to demographic representation in Parliament. The most plausible explanation of the social bias, on the basis of this analysis, is that supply-side factors play a major role in recruitment. The most important of these factors -determining who came forward to pursue a parliamentary career -were age, class and education. The well-established socioeconomic bias seems attributable to the resources and motivation associated 
